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Introduction 
The synthesis of the G.Sigler’s rule of the optimal search with the classical individual labor 
supply model enlarges the understanding of the phenomenon of money flexibility. The 
constraints of the search model makes the Lagrangian multiplier equal to the marginal utility of 
the wage rate and establish the correspondence between the purchase price elasticity of the 
marginal utility of consumption expenditures, the wage rate elasticity of the marginal utility of 
money, and the wage rate elasticity of purchase prices. This correspondence can review the 
“leisure model” of behavior as well as the Veblen effect. The phenomenon of the sunk costs 
sensitivity also becomes more understandable. 
 
JEL Classification: D11, D83. 
 
The Lagrangian multiplier in the search model 
The optimal consumption-leisure choice under price dispersion can be presented by the utility 
function (U(Q,H) which is constrained by the equality of marginal values of search to its 
marginal benefit, or 
w∂L
∂S =Q
∂P
∂S (1)  
where 
w – the wage rate; Q – the quantity purchased; L – the labor time: S - the time of search. 
∂L/∂S – propensity to search (∂L/∂S<0) 
∂P/∂S – price reduction during the search (∂P/∂S<0) 
We take the value of the wage rate and the value of the price reduction as constant values. The 
constant ∂P/∂S value means that when we concludes the search at the certain satisficing price 
level we have spent time S on the search and we have got the price reduction ∆P in our 
willingness to pay. At this price level we determine how much we should buy for the period of 
time until the next purchase. The chosen quantity Q determines the labor time L we need to 
restore our cash-in-the-pocket or money balances (Here, we can bypass the monetary theory by 
the simple appeal to the H.Leibenstein’s understanding of the static analysis, who presented the 
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static situation as one in which the order of events was of no significance (Leibenstein 1950, 
p.187), or by the come-back to old days when debts were recorded by shopkeepers in 
notebooks). And for the chosen time horizon of our consumption-leisure choice T (a day, couple 
of days, a week, a year) we finally determine the leisure time H =T – S - L we will need to 
consume the chosen quantity Q. So, the time of search S diminishes the labor income wL(S), 
required for the purchase. However, multiplied by the amount of search S=dS, the value 
∂wL/∂S<0 gives us the total loss in labor income during the search with regard to the labor 
income reserved for the purchase wL0.  
So, we can formulate the following problem: 
maxU(Q,H ) subject to w−Q∂P /∂S
∂L /∂S (2)  
This search model of the optimal consumption-leisure choice has been already presented with 
the help of the Cobb-Douglas utility function U(Q,H) = Q-∂L/∂SH-∂H/∂S. That intuition was 
supported by the fact that the marginal utility of substitution of leisure for consumption in the 
search model corresponds to the MRS value for the utility function with constant elasticity of 
substitution σ =1, because from the equation L+S+H=T we have (∂L/∂S+∂H/∂S) =-1: 
 
MRS(HforQ)=− dQdH =−
w
∂P /∂S∂
2L /∂S∂H =− Q
∂L /∂S∂
2L /∂S∂H;
dQ
dH =
w
∂P /∂S∂
2L /∂S∂H = Q
∂L /∂S∂
2L /∂S∂H = QT(H −T )
1
T =
Q
H
H
(H −T ) =
Q
H
(H −T +T )
(H −T ) ; (3)
dQ
dH =
Q
H (1+
T
H −T )=
Q
H (1+
1
∂L ∂S )=
Q
H (
∂L ∂S+1
∂L ∂S );
∂L ∂S =−α⇒ dQdH =−
Q
H (
1−α
α
)
 
The only difference between the search model and the classical model of the individual labor 
supply is the extraction of the time of search as productive time from the time of leisure and its 
analytical addition, as we are going to see in the set of Equations (4), to the time of labor. 
Usually the search cuts not only the labor time but also the leisure time (∂H/∂S<0). The 
following set of inequalities (-1<∂L/∂S<0; ∂H/∂S<0) describes the “common model” of 
consumer behavior. And this “common model” can be presented with the help of the 
Archimedes’ principle. The search displaces in the time horizon of the consumption-leisure 
choice both the labor time and the leisure time, like ice displaces both whiskey and soda in the 
glass.  The Archimedes’ principle enables the understanding of the relationship between the 
labor and the search, or the function L= L(S): 
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L(S)=T −H(S)−S;
∂L /∂S =−∂H /∂S−1;
a) dH(S)= dS∂H
∂S =−dS
H
T
⇓
b) ∂L
∂S =−
∂H
∂S −1=
H
T −1=
H −T
T =−
L+S
T (4)
c) ∂L
∂S =−
L+S
T ⇒∂
2L /∂S2 =−∂L /∂S+1T < 0
d) ∂L
∂S =
H −T
T ⇒∂
2L /∂S∂H =1/T;
 
Using the Archimedes’ principle, we can reconsider the value of the time horizon of the 
consumption-leisure choice. In the search model the value of the time horizon equals not to the 
chronological period but to the period of the product lifecycle, i.e., to the moment of the next 
purchase of the same item. (Equation 4d) The greater time horizon increases not only the 
required labor time but also the leisure time, required by consumption. So, the increase in the 
value of time horizon decreases the absolute value of propensity to search |∂L/∂S|. 
The set of Equations (4) simplifies the presentation of the values of marginal utilities, derived 
form the solution of the utility maximization problem (2), and it explains step-by-step derivation 
of the MRS(H for Q) in the Equation (3): 
MUQ = λ ∂P /∂S∂L /∂S = λ
w
Q (5a)
MUH =−λQ ∂P /∂S(∂L /∂S)2 ∂
2L /∂S∂H =−λ w
∂L /∂S∂
2L /∂S∂H = λ wL+S
T
T = λ
w
L+S (5b)
 
Now, if we optimize utility U* with regard to the wage rate w with the help of the chain rule, we 
get 
∂U*
∂w =
∂U
∂Q
∂Q
∂w +
∂U
∂H
∂H
∂w = λ
∂P /∂S
∂L /∂S
∂Q
∂w +
w
L+S
∂H
∂w
"
#
$
%
&
'
∂P /∂S
∂L /∂S
∂Q
∂w =
∂P /∂S
∂L /∂S
1
∂P /∂S
∂L
∂S +w
∂(∂L /∂S)
∂w
(
)
*
+
,
-=1+ w∂L /∂S
∂(∂L /∂S)
∂w =1+e∂L/∂S,w
w
L+S
∂H
∂w =−
w
L+S
∂(L+S)
∂w =−
w
(L+S) /T
∂(L+S) /T
∂w =−
w
∂L /∂S
∂(∂L /∂S)
∂w =−e∂L/∂S,w (6)
∂U*
∂w =
∂U
∂Q
∂Q
∂w +
∂U
∂H
∂H
∂w = λ
∂P /∂S
∂L /∂S
∂Q
∂w +
w
L+S
∂H
∂w
"
#
$
%
&
'= λ 1+e∂L/∂S,w −e∂L/∂S,w"# %&= λ
 
Then, we can re-arrange the equation (1) with the help of the Equation (4b) in the following 
manner: 
- T∂P/∂S = w(L+S) = P0         (7) 
The Equation (7) gives us the value of the price equivalent of the potential labor income 
w(L+S), which could be earned by the consumer if he has spent all time of search on working. 
The value of the price equivalent of the potential labor income simplifies the presentation of the 
value of the marginal utility of consumption. Now we can write for consumption and leisure 
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λ = ∂U
*
∂w ;
MUQ = λ ∂P /∂S∂L /∂S = λT
∂P /∂S
L+S = λ
P0
L+S =
∂U*
∂w
P0
T −H ; (8)
MUH = λ wL+S =
∂U*
∂w
w
T −H
 
However, if we repeat step by the step the same utility optimization procedure within the 
individual labor supply model, we get almost the same result for the classical consumption-
leisure choice (Baxley and Moorhouse 1984): 
∂U*
∂w =
∂U
∂Q
∂Q
∂w +
∂U
∂H
∂H
∂w = λP
∂Q
∂w +λw
∂H
∂w = λ P
∂Q
∂w +w
∂H
∂w
"
#
$
%
&
'
wT =PQ+wH⇒T =P∂Q
∂w +w
∂H
∂w +H⇒T −H =P
∂Q
∂w +w
∂H
∂w (9)
λ = ∂U
*
∂w
1
T −H
 
and, finally 
λ = ∂U
*
∂w
1
T −H ;
MUQ = λP =P∂U
*
∂w
1
T −H ; (10)
MUH = λw=w∂U
*
∂w
1
T −H
 
So, the graphical presentation, given with unusual attributes, simply represents the specific form 
of the graphical resolution of the optimal consumption-leisure choice for T = 24 hours (Fig1): 
Fig.1 
 
There are two important differences between two models. First, the value of the Lagrangian 
multiplier λ in the search model is exactly equal to the marginal utility of the wage rate, or 
MUw=λ, while in the classical model we need to adjust it to the allocation of time between labor 
and leisure. Second, in the classical model the marginal utility of consumption is determined by 
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the equilibrium purchase price Pe, while the marginal utility of consumption in the search model 
is determined by the price equivalent of the potential labor income P0=w(L+S).  
Now we cannot definitely answer to the question whether, when search costs are positive, the 
price equivalent of potential labor income is the equilibrium price, but, if we re-arrange the 
Equation 3, we can simplify the presentation of the marginal rate of substitution of leisure for 
consumption: 
∂U /∂H
∂U /∂Q =MRS(HforQ)=−
Q
∂L /∂S∂
2L /∂S∂H =− w
∂P /∂S∂
2L /∂S∂H =− w
∂P /∂S
1
T =
w
P0
(11)  
The analysis of the satisficing decision procedure (Malakhov 2012b) can clarify the concept of 
the price equivalent of the potential labor income (Fig.2): 
Fig.2 
WTP=WTA&
wL0
TS
P(S)
wL(S)
L+S
Pp
P0 =w(L+S)
 
Here, the purchase price PP is equal to the labor income wL. So, the value of the labor income, 
reserved for the purchase before we start to search, wL0=wL+dwL(S), can represent our 
willingness to pay. And we can say that the equilibrium value of price reduction ∂P/∂S simply 
represents the rate of the decrease in the willingness to pay during the search.  
It is more difficult to determine the price equivalent of the potential labor income. It looks like a 
high-order willingness to pay with regard to the reservation level or the reservation price. 
P.Diamond used that approach when he described the behavior of shoppers with high willingness 
to pay (Diamond 1987). On the other hand, the Equation (11) initiates the other P.Diamond’s 
consideration, that with positive search costs the equilibrium price is equal to the monopoly price 
(Diamond 1971). However, the idea of the monopoly price seems not to be an appropriate 
explanation of the price equivalent of the potential labor income, because if a monopoly sets the 
price at the level of the potential labor income, consumers will increase their labor supply by the 
time of search, and this increase in labor supply will decrease the wage rate. The price equivalent 
of the potential labor income at lower wage rate will become unattainable. 
We should keep in mind that this value is to some extent virtual, which can be determined only 
ex post, when we conclude the search. This ex ante – ex post relationship between the reserved 
labor income and the potential labor income provokes the idea that here we have the WTP-WTA 
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relationship and the potential labor income represents the price that compensates not only 
monetary losses, which are equal to the purchase price PP=wL, but also losses in the time of 
search, calculated ex post on the base of the wage rate, or wS. However, this consideration needs 
the answer to the question whether the willingness to accept is an appropriate equivalent of the 
equilibrium price when search costs are positive. 
Finally, it is easy to demonstrate that all above-presented equations are valid for the case when 
the search costs are equal to zero, or S=0. Here, all properties of the search model become 
equivalent to the corresponding values of the classical individual labor supply model. The utility 
function takes the usual U(Q,H)=QL/THH/T form. The propensity to search becomes equal to the 
(-L/T) ratio, the MRS (H for Q) becomes equal to the Q/L ratio, and the value of the marginal 
utility of consumption MUQ becomes equal to the classical λPP value, where λ is equal to the 
(∂U*/∂w)/(T-H) ratio. Indeed, when the search costs are equal to zero, the purchase price is equal 
to the potential labor income and the willingness to pay becomes equal to the willingness to 
accept. 
 
Money flexibility and the Veblen effect 
The equation MUw=λ tells us that the marginal utility of labor income per unit of time is equal to 
the marginal utility of an extra unit of money. However, the search process produces the non-
labor income through the reduction in prices of purchases.  
We can analyze the marginal utility of price reduction. However, for a better understanding and 
for illustrative purposes, we will use the absolute value of price reduction |∂P/∂S|, keeping in 
mind that due to ∂2P/∂S2 >0, the increase in the absolute value |∂P/∂S| means the increase in 
price. The substitution of the value ∂P/∂S by the absolute value |∂P/∂S| as well as the substitution 
of the value ∂L/∂S by the absolute value |∂L/∂S| does not matter. However, somebody can use 
real values, keeping in mind corresponding changes in marginal values. 
 
∂U*
∂ |∂P /∂S |=
∂U
∂Q
∂Q
∂ |∂P /∂S |+
∂U
∂H
∂H
∂ |∂P /∂S |= λ
w
Q
∂Q
∂ |∂P /∂S |+
w
L+S
∂H
∂ |∂P /∂S |
"
#
$
%
&
'
= λ w
∂P /∂S
|∂P /∂S |
Q
∂Q
∂ |∂P /∂S |+
|∂P /∂S |
L+S
∂(T −(L+S))
∂ |∂P /∂S |
"
#
$
%
&
' (13)
= λ w|∂P /∂S | eQ,|∂P/∂S| −
|∂P /∂S |
(L+S) /T
∂(L+S) /T )
∂ |∂P /∂S |
"
#
$
%
&
'
= λ w|∂P /∂S | eQ,|∂P/∂S| − e|∂L/∂S|,|∂P/∂S|"# %&
 
The key equation (1) of the search model can transform this result. If we present the key 
equation (1) in the elasticity form, we get for the constant wage rate 
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Q ∂P
∂S =w
∂L
∂S ⇒ eQ,|∂P/∂S|+1= e|∂L/∂S|,|∂P/∂S| (14)
eQ,|∂P/∂S|−e|∂L/∂S|,|∂P/∂S| =−1
 
This elasticity form of the key equation (1) gives us the value of the marginal utility of price 
reduction 
∂U*
∂ |∂P /∂S |= λ
w
|∂P /∂S | eQ,|∂P/∂S| − e|∂L/∂S|,|∂P/∂S|#$ %&=−λ
w
|∂P /∂S | (15)  
We see, that the increase in the absolute value of price reduction |∂P/∂S| decreases the utility and 
the decrease in the absolute value of price reduction increases the total utility. The negative value 
of the marginal utility of price reduction MU|∂P/∂S| needs some methodological comments. The 
search produces the non-labor income and the greater absolute value of price reduction increases 
money balances. In this sense, the marginal utility of price reduction is positive. But the 
assumption of the decreasing efficiency of search, or ∂2P/∂S2>0, establishes the direct 
correspondence between the value of the purchase price and the value of price reduction. The 
greater absolute value of the price reduction corresponds to the greater purchase price. (The case, 
when consumers meet big discounts and thereby find low purchase prices, is examined with 
regard to the reduction in the time horizon of consumption-leisure choice or shelf lives, like it 
happens with pork sausages, for example. (Malakhov 2012b). Then, in order to avoid the 
confusion, we will regard the value MU|∂P/∂S| as the marginal utility of the price reduction at a 
certain price level of purchase, and, because the increase in price decreases the utility and 
MU|∂P/∂S| <0, we will use the notion of the marginal disutility of price reduction. 
Its unusual form raises the question whether we have the same value of marginal utility of an 
extra unit of money when we compare labor income with non-labor income. However, it is easy 
to show that pecunia non olet and the value of the Lagrangian multiplier, or the extra utility of an 
extra unit of money, is the same for labor income as well as for non-labor income. 
The Equation (15) is very useful. It uncovers the anatomy of the search process. First of all, we 
can see that different levels of wage rate result in different values of the marginal disutility of 
price reduction. Moreover, their relationship is reciprocal. The greater wage rate results in the 
greater marginal disutility of price reduction. This is a real phenomenon because when the value 
of price reduction represents the rate of the decrease of the purchase price with respect to the 
willingness to pay, the increase in the absolute level of price reduction |∂P/∂S| first of all means 
the increase in the willingness to pay as the result of the increase in the wage rate.  
The increase in the willingness to pay happens due to the increase in the opportunity costs of 
search, i.e., in the increase of the wage rate. Trying to save time, individuals begin to buy in 
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nearby stores at high prices.1 However, they can keep their willingness to pay constant and they 
can continue to buy in a distant supermarket. If the value |∂P/∂S| is constant, we expect that the 
marginal disutility of price reduction MU|∂P/∂S| is also constant.  
In order to verify this assumption, let’s analyze the total change in the marginal disutility of price 
reduction with regard to the change in the wage rate 
∂MU|∂P/∂S|
∂w =−
∂λ
∂w
w
|∂P /∂S |+λ
∂ w|∂P /∂S |
#
$
%
&
'
(
∂w
)
*
+
+
+
+
,
-
.
.
.
.
=− λ|∂P /∂S | eλ,w +1−e|∂P/∂S|,w)* ,- (16)  
We can see, that the marginal disutility MU|∂P/∂S| of consumers who continues to buy in the same 
place at the same price after the increase in their wage rates (e|∂P/∂S|.w =0) stays constant only if 
the marginal utility of the wage rate is unit elastic, or eλ,w = -1. If it is not, consumers will face 
either the increase or the decrease in the marginal disutility of price reduction, may be, in the 
form of the irritation from shopping with respect to their income levels. 
Here, we can address to the original R.Frisch’s analysis of the phenomenon of money flexibility 
(Frisch 1959). It can give us some ideas about feelings of consumers with different income levels 
when they meet each other in the same supermarket. Things look like consumers with lower 
wage rate elasticity of the marginal utility of income eλ,w, i.e., “the better-off part of the 
population” get greater disutility in supermarkets than “the median part of the population”, 
because the increase in wage rates of the “median part” considerably reduces the disutility of 
shopping to its minimal negative values. 
From here we can continue to follow the Frisch’s methodology. When the second cross 
derivatives of utility are equal, or ∂MU|∂P/∂S|/∂w =∂MUw/∂|∂P/∂S| and when MUw=λ, we can 
simply re-write the Equation (16) in the following form 
∂MU|∂P/∂S|
∂w =
∂λ
∂ |∂P /∂S |=−
∂λ
∂w
w
|∂P /∂S |+λ
∂ w|∂P /∂S |
#
$
%
&
'
(
∂w
)
*
+
+
+
+
,
-
.
.
.
.
=− λ|∂P /∂S | eλ,w +1−e|∂P/∂S|,w)* ,- (17)  
 
Then, we make one more step and we get the general relationship of the marginal utilities of 
wage rate and of consumption expenditures under the search process. 
∂λ
∂ |∂P /∂S |=−
λ
|∂P /∂S | eλ,w +1−e|∂P/∂S|,w#$ %&
∂λ
∂ |∂P /∂S |
|∂P /∂S |
λ
=− eλ,w +1−e|∂P/∂S|,w#$ %& (18)
eλ,|∂P/∂S|+eλ,w +1−e|∂P/∂S|,w = 0
 
                                            
1 Here we simply follow the Salop-Stiglitz’s assumption, that only high-search-cost individuals make purchases in 
high-price stores (Stiglitz 1979, p. 141 ) 
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Really, the value eλ,|∂P/∂S| seems to be an appropriate representation of the concept of the 
marginal utility of money expenditures carefully derived by M.Blaug from the analysis of the 
Marshallian “Principles” (Blaug 1997, pp.322-323). Really, even when second cross derivatives 
are equal, they have different economic sense. From here we can leave the concept of the 
marginal disutility of price reduction and begin to use the concept of the price reduction 
elasticity of the marginal utility of money expenditures eλ,|∂P/∂S|.  
We can see that for the unit elastic marginal utility of income (eλ,w = -1) the choice of the high-
price store after the increase in the wage rate makes the elasticity of the marginal utility of 
money expenditures, here the value eλ,|∂P/∂S|, positive, or 
eλ,|∂P/∂S| = e|∂P/∂S|,w (19)  
However, again different fluctuations of the wage rate elasticity of the marginal elasticity of 
income produce different combinations of all above-presented values. 
Here we come to the real variety of combinatorics because every value from the Equation (18) 
represents the pair of the other independent variables. It is very difficult to describe all possible 
changes in the Equation (18). But it is worth looking at some of them.  
First of all, we should take into consideration the proportional change in the marginal utility of 
an item to be bought and the change in willingness to pay. This proportional change happens, for 
example, when we make the trade-off between the quality and the price. Again, the shift in the  
|∂P/∂S| value means here the choice of high-price store with quality items. However, the 
assumption of the proportional change in the marginal utility and in the willingness to pay results 
in the constant value of the marginal utility of consumption expenditures. And its price reduction 
elasticity eλ,|∂P/∂S| becomes equal to zero. 
The Equation (18) takes the following form 
eλ,w = e|∂P/∂S|,w −1 (20)  
It means, that the inappropriate ambitious choice of a store, where the wage rate elasticity of 
price reduction is greater than one, or e|∂P/∂S|.w >1, makes the wage rate elasticity of the marginal 
utility of income positive. 
There are two possible explanations to this phenomenon. First and the most evident explanation 
is the risk-seeking behavior, or ∂λ/∂w>0. We can find many examples of such risky decisions in 
the real estate sector. 
However, not all luxury items are risky. The Chateau Lafite Rothschild 1995 from Pauillac and 
the Opus XA from Arturo Fuente bought to celebrate new position can hardly be regarded as 
investments in risky assets. There is another consideration. We can ask ourselves whether a 
dollar spent on those items has really increased the utility, or, more definitely whether the 
marginal utility of the increase in the wage rate has been positive. 
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Before we reject these seemingly absurd questions, let’s analyze changes in marginal utilities of 
both consumption and leisure under this assumption. 
If we come back to our previous results we can see that 
MUQ = λ ∂P /∂S∂L /∂S (21a)
MUH =−λ w∂L /∂S∂
2L /∂S∂H (21b)
 
If we take the inequality w<|∂P/∂S|, we quit the “common model” of behavior and we come to 
the “leisure model” of behavior, because the w<|∂P/∂S| relationship changes the allocation of 
time. The absolute value of the propensity to search becomes greater than one, or |∂L/∂S|>1 and 
∂L/∂S<-1. But now the relationship between leisure and search becomes positive, or ∂H/∂S>0. 
And this change means that the increase in the absolute value of the propensity to search |∂L/∂S|, 
i.e., its decrease in real terms, is followed now by the increase in leisure time, or ∂2L/∂S∂H<0. 
Let’s come back to the Equations (21). This result doesn’t change the marginal utility of 
consumption, but it dramatically changes the marginal utility of leisure. The latter becomes 
negative and the leisure becomes “bad”. 
That conclusion had been done in the previous analysis of the Veblen effect (Malakhov 2012c). 
Things looked like we wasted time at parties after the purchase of a suit. However, that 
consideration was dialectically incomplete. We told about it, when it was discussed that either 
the purchase of a suit made parties “reasonable”, or parties made “reasonable’ the purchase of a 
suit. 
If we presuppose that the value of the Lagrangian multiplier becomes negative, we change the 
representation of marginal utilities of both consumption and leisure. Now the consumption 
becomes “bad”, whereas the marginal utility of leisure again becomes positive. From here we 
can increase the total utility only with the increase in leisure time. The party organized in order 
to celebrate the new position increases the total utility, where negative marginal utilities of the 
Chateau Lafite Rothschild 1995 from Pauillac and of the Opus XA from Arturo Fuente become 
invisible.  
Moreover, the increase in leisure time, required to restore the positive utility of such a “luxury” 
consumption-leisure choice, automatically increases the absolute value of the equilibrium price 
reduction |∂P/∂S|, i.e., the purchase price, and the Veblen effect takes place (Fig.3):2 
Fig.3 
                                            
2 Here we should keep in mind that usually there is a certain physical or psychological minimum level of leisure 
time where ∂L/∂S=-1. 
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It is very easy to follow all these consideration with the help of the value of the MRS (H for Q), 
derived earlier and repeated here in illustrative purposes: 
∂U /∂H
∂U /∂Q =MRS(HforQ)=−
w
∂P /∂S∂
2L /∂S∂H (22)  
In addition, this consideration can enlarge our understanding of the phenomenon of the sunk 
costs sensitivity and it can also explain dramatic increase in leisure time during last decades 
(Aguiar and Hurst 2007). Coming back to the key equation of the model (1) we can see that the 
“leisure model” of behavior (∂L/∂S<-1;∂H/∂S>0;∂2L/∂S∂H<0) can be produced not only by 
luxury items with corresponding high absolute values of the equilibrium price reduction |∂P/∂S|. 
We can also see that the value of the lower wage rate can produce the same effect even on 
almost perfect markets with low absolute values of the equilibrium price reduction, but with very 
important quantity to be purchased, or w<|Q∂P/∂S|. 
It seems that the “leisure model” of behavior is the result of large money balances, when the 
marginal usefulness of money becomes negative (Friedman 1969). However, the phenomenon of 
the positive wage rate elasticity of the marginal utility of money needs more detailed analysis. 
 
Conclusion 
When market environment progressively relaxes budget constraints, the development of Stigler’s 
rule of the equality of marginal costs of search with its marginal benefit becomes more and more 
important in the understanding of consumer behavior (Stigler 1961). If we presuppose that the 
price reduction itself is unit elastic, or e|∂P/∂S|.P =1, we can re-write the Equation (18) in the 
following form: 
eλ,P +eλ,w = eP,w −1 (23)  
And this equation can give us the better understanding of many economic phenomena, money 
illusion, for example. 
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